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uropean  policy-makers  have  decided  that  they  must  be  seen  to  be  “doing 
something” about youth unemployment. A special summit of Europe’s heads 
of state has been called, and a “Youth Employment Initiative”, proposed at the 
EU  Council  of  Ministers  meeting  in  March,  aims  to  “reinforce  and  accelerate” 
measures  that  were  recommended  in  a  “Youth  Employment  Package”  in  December 
2012. 
This  activism  comes  mainly  in  response  to  the  latest  alarming  figures  on  youth 
unemployment  in  southern  Europe,  with  sky-high  rates  of  joblessness  widely 
regarded as politically inacceptable. But there are several reasons to doubt that youth 
unemployment  is  a  discrete  problem  meriting  special  treatment.  Indeed,  official 
youth unemployment statistics are misleading on two counts. 
First, the data refer to those from 15 to 24 years old. But this age group consists of 
two sub-groups with very different characteristics. The “teenagers” (15-19 years old) 
should mostly still be in school; if not, they are likely to be very low skilled – and 
thus to have difficulty finding a full-time job even in good times. Fortunately, this 
group is rather small (and has been declining in size over time). 
Unemployment among those aged 20-24 should be more troubling. Members of this 
cohort  who  are  seeking  full-time  employment  have  typically  completed  upper 
secondary education, but have decided not to pursue university education (or have 
completed their university studies early). 
Second,  the  data  on  youth  unemployment  are  based  on  active  labour-market 
participants. But labour-market participation averages just 10% among teenagers in 
Europe.  (Teen-age  activity  rates  come  close  to  one-half  only  in  countries  like  the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, where having a part-time job while in school 
is very common.) 
Labour-market  experts  thus  consider  the  unemployment  rate  a  potentially 
misleading indicator, because a youth unemployment rate of 50% does not mean that 
half of the young population is unemployed. That is why one should look at the 
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unemployment ratio – the percentage of the unemployed in the reference population 
– rather than at the unemployment rate. 
Indeed, this indicator paints a somewhat less alarming picture than that created by 
the headline youth-unemployment rate of more than 50% in Spain, or even the 66% 
rate recently reached in Greece. The youth-unemployment rate in Greece does not 
mean that two-thirds of young Greeks youth are unemployed. Only 9% of Greek 
teenagers are labour-market participants; two-thirds of that number cannot find a 
job. The unemployment ratio among teenagers in Greece is thus less than 6%. But this 
statistic is not reported widely because it is much less alarming.  Figure 1 below 
shows that this is not an isolated case. The link between unemployment rates and 
ratios is very weak in general. 
Figure 1. Unemployment rate versus unemployment ratio among teenagers (15-19) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 
Among  the  “twens”  (20-24  years  old)  the  difference  between  the  reported 
employment rate and the percentage of youth without a job and looking for one (the 
unemployment ratio) is less stark. But, even among this age group, one finds that the 
unemployment ratio is often about one-half of the widely reported unemployment 
rate. 
Moreover,  one  should  look  at  youth  unemployment  in  the  context  of  the  overall 
labour market. Figure 2 shows that for most countries youth unemployment has been 
rather stable if compared to overall unemployment. But in some countries, youth 
unemployment is much higher relative to overall unemployment. Italy constitutes 
the most egregious case with the youth unemployment rate over three times higher 
than the overall unemployment rate. But this is not a recent phenomenon –it was like 
this even before the outbreak of the crisis. By contrast, the youth unemployment rate 
in Germany is ‘only’ 1.5 times higher than the overall unemployment rate (it used to 
be lower, but this relationship deteriorated somewhat after the Harz reforms of 2003, 
which led to lower unemployment among older workers). 
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Figure 2. Youth unemployment rate relative to total unemployment rate  
 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
Finally,  one  must  ask  how  much  youth  unemployment  contributes  to  total 
unemployment.  Looking  at  the  problem  this  way  reveals  a  completely  different 
picture from the one usually presented. 
In those countries where the problem makes the biggest headlines (the eurozone’s 
south,  with  Greece  and  Spain  supposedly  the  worst  cases),  youth  unemployment 
accounts  for  less  than  a  quarter  of  overall  unemployment.  By  contrast,  youth 
unemployment  contributes  relatively  much  more  (about  40%)  to  overall 
unemployment in countries like Sweden and the UK. One could argue that the latter 
two  should  worry  about  their  youth  unemployment  more  than  Spain  or  Greece 
should.   
The fact that youth unemployment is just a part of a larger problem leads to the real 
policy question: Why should officials spend limited time, energy and public funding 
specifically on unemployed young people, rather than on all of the unemployed?1 
Does a teenager’s unemployment represent a greater loss to society than that of a 
single mother or an older worker, who might have been providing an entire family’s 
only income? The loss of the value added produced by a teenager is probably much 
lower. 
In  purely  economic  terms,  one  could  thus  argue  that  youth  unemployment 
(especially  teenage  part-time  unemployment)  is  much  less  important  than 
unemployment among the ‘prime age’ segment of the population. Moreover, young 
people have the option  of continuing their education, thus adding to their future 
earnings power, whereas continuing education is a much less viable alternative for 
their elders. 
                                                   
1 The example of the Harz reforms in Germany is instructive: these reforms were not 
targeted  at  youth  specifically,  but  are  widely  credited  with  having  lowered  the 
overall unemployment rate. 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
EU27 Germany Spain France Italy4 | DANIEL GROS 
 
Europe has a general macroeconomic problem, owing to demand factors that interact 
with a rigid labour market, rather than a specific youth-unemployment problem. This 
implies that there is no need for ad hoc measures for young people, which merely 
risk overloading welfare systems with even more exemptions and special rules. 